

BULLETIN

No. 11

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1. Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the Canadian Society of Biblical Studies

The fourteenth annual meeting of the Canadian Society of Biblical Studies was held concurrently with the eighth annual meeting of the Canadian Section of the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis, in Knox College, Toronto, on the evening of May 14, and the morning and afternoon of May 15, 1946. The acting President, Professor W.E. Staples, was in the chair.

First Session, Tuesday evening May 14

Twenty-one members and one visitor were present.

Correspondence: The secretary read a letter from Mrs. Richard Davidson, acknowledging the society's memorial resolution in respect to her late husband; a letter from Professor F.W. Dillistone under date of June 7, 1945, regretfully tendering his resignation as president of the society; and regrets for absence from the meeting from Dr. W.A. Ferguson and Dr. K.C. Evans.

The secretary reported on the following business arising out of the minutes of the last annual meeting:

- (a) Regarding the time of the Annual Meeting, that as a result of a ballot taken in January 1945, the executive decided that the society should revert to a May meeting.
- (b) The executive considered Professor Dow's proposal, referred to it by the last Annual Meeting, "that the basis of the Society be broadened, so that theological interests, other than those exclusively biblical, might be represented in both its membership and the Annual presentation of papers". The executive drew attention to the constitution of the Society which states that "the object of the Society shall be the encouragement in Canada of Biblical and closely related studies", and feels that these theological interests that are closely related in one way or another to the Bible, do fall within the purview of the Society. The executive made certain suggestions which were referred by motion to the new executive:
 - (a) that even within the Biblical field, there is no reason, in the constitution of the Society, why most of the papers in recent years have been so largely of a literary and historical character. As far as the Society is concerned, what may be termed the "Theological approach" to the Bible is as legitimate an approach as any other.
 - (b) that one session of the Annual Meeting, preferably a morning session, be reserved for the less technical papers, in the belief that such a session would be of special interest and value to parish ministers.
 - (c) that the new executive explore the possibilities of symposia and/or of asking certain scholars to give papers on subjects on which they can speak with authority.

The secretary further reported: that the membership now stands at 68, of whom 56 paid the fee for the past year, that 100 copies of the Tenth Annual Bulletin were published, that the treasury had a credit balance of \$50.47, with all accounts paid.

Auditors appointed were Professor Andrews and Mr. Williams. Nominating Committee appointed, consisting of Professor McNeill, Dr. Cosgrave and Professor Scott.

The following were nominated to membership:

- Rev. G.B. McLennan
- Provost R.S.K. Seeley
- Dean A.D. Matheson
- Professor R. Lennox
- Rabbi Emil L. Fackenheim

Professor J.S. Glen, on behalf of the staff of Knox College extended a warm welcome to the College.

Professor W.E. Staples then delivered the presidential address, his subject being "Some Aspects of Sin in the Old Testament".

Second Session, Wednesday morning, May 15

Twenty-six members were present.

Professor Andrews reported that the auditors had found the treasurer's accounts in good order.

The following were nominated to membership:

- Professor J.S. Glen
- Rev. J. Wasson

On the casting of a ballot those nominated at both sessions were declared elected to the society's membership. It was agreed that the Travel Pool be supplemented, if necessary by a sum of money from the general funds, this sum not to exceed ten dollars.

The following papers were read:

- Dr. F.H. Cosgrave - Jerome's Revisions of the Latin Psalter
- Rev. F.J. Jackson - Jesus and Institutionalized Religion
- Professor W.S. McCullough - A Reexamination of Isaiah 56 - 66
- Professor T.J. Meek - A New Interpretation of Deuteronomy 11:16
- Dr. J.H. Michael - The Order of the Four Judgments in Revelation 6:8b

Third Session, Wednesday afternoon, May 15

Twenty members were present.

The following were elected as the executive for the coming year.

- President - Professor J. Dow
- Vice-president - Professor W.S. McCullough
- Secretary-treasurer - Rev. Dr. G.H. Johnson
- Other members of the executive - Professor D.K. Andrews, Professor C.R. Feilding, Professor S.M. Gilmour.

The secretary was instructed to write a letter of thanks to the principal of Knox College for the use of the College during the sessions.

The following papers were read:

- Rev. F. North - Not Pashhur but Terror: A Critical Analysis of Jeremiah 19:14-20:6
- Professor F. Beare - The Authenticity of Colossians
- Professor F.V. Winnett - The Tradition of the Ten Murmurings in the Wilderness
- Rabbi H.A. Fischel - Prophet and Martyr (in Jewish literature in the New Testament period)
- Mr. R.J. Williams - A Note on Job 16:20

The following members were present at one or more sessions:

Andrews	Hay	Meek
Beare	Horan	Mellow
Bristol	Jackson	Michael
Cosgrave	Johnson	Newby
Dow	MacNeill	North
Dowker	McCullough	Scott
Fairweather	McLennan	Shortt
Fischel	McLeod	Staples
Gilmour S. M.	McPherson	Williams
Glen	Matheson	Winnett

The Presidential Address

Some Aspects of Sin in the Old Testament - Professor W.E. Staples

According to the Oxford dictionary, sin is a transgression against a divine or moral law. A philosopher would define sin as an act of an individual which if practiced by everyone would be contrary to reason and undesirable; or a transgression against a social convention; or an act which would detract from the individual's purpose in life.

In modern Western society, however, there are certain essential hypotheses underlying the idea of sin. The deity has given men freedom of will to choose the evil, that they may be at liberty to choose the good. Man as an individual is personally responsible for his acts. Man, before, or in the process of carrying out a wrong act, is conscious that what he is about to do, or is doing, is wrong, or at least, is not for the highest good for himself or for others. Wrong-doing merits punishment for the wrong-doer himself, and only for himself. Sin in itself is wrong, and cannot be used as a vehicle for good, or perhaps we may say: if the end is good, the means toward that end cannot be sin.

In Hebrew society there were undoubtedly certain essential hypotheses underlying their idea of sin. Nowhere are these set forth in any logical fashion. We can only classify the various uses of the word and its cognates, and from this classification make some attempt to determine the hypotheses of the Hebrews.

Even a casual reading of the Old Testament must impress us with the idea that Yahweh manipulated the movements of his people, and individuals among them for his own ends. Such an idea is directly contrary to our first hypothesis. Only in the latter part of the seventh century and the early part of the sixth century was there any idea of personal and individual responsibility. The Deuteronomist advocated the punishment of the sinner for his sin after being convicted by a court. Jeremiah and Ezekiel emphasized the idea of the individual responsibility in the eyes of God. It is only in this period of stress that we find any break in the concept of tribal or national responsibility. Even at that time, these revelations were mere flashes of inspiration, and were not universally accepted. The group concept continued to have active support not only in Deutero-Isaiah, but with the separatists, Ezekiel, Ezra and Nehemiah. Only when we come to the wisdom literature do we find the responsibility of the individual taken for granted. When we consider that the hypothesis of individual responsibility is an essential element in our definition of sin, we must recognize that the Hebrew concept differed. When we consider, too, that the deity in Ecclesiastes directed man's activities through his ruah or spirit, we must assume that to the Hebrews, man was not a free agent, even at the end of the Old Testament period.

It is clearly demonstrated in Old Testament writings that the doer of sin was not conscious that his act was of a sinful nature until the unpleasant after effects were felt. Since he was not conscious of wrong-doing before or at the time of his act, under our definition we cannot consider him a sinner.

The idea of family or national responsibility is frequently demonstrated by the assertion that the children or grandchildren suffer for the deed of their progenitor, or that the nation at large suffers for the sin of a king. To the Old Testament authors there is a very close relationship between punishment and sin. The divine instruments of punishment which includes famine, war, drought, hail, locusts, storm, plagues and flood, cannot under any circumstances be considered as discriminatory in regard to the persons afflicted, and it is persons who sin. This tribal or national responsibility was probably the basis for the statement in Gen. 8:21, that man was evil from his youth, the period at which he became a tribal member, and as such bore his portion of the sin of the tribe. While this idea of the nation or group as a unit may have been the basis for the development of the idea of vicarious suffering, it is quite in contrast with our idea of individual responsibility, an element essential to our concept of sin.

A personal and individual consciousness that an act is not for the best is an essential element in our concept of sin. There are numerous instances in the Old Testament which would indicate that the doer of an act was in doubt as to its being in accord with the divine will. The feeling of the necessity for an infallible medium is the result of this uncertainty. The use of Urim and Thummim, necromancy, omens, priests, seers, and prophets as this infallible medium is a denial of the validity of personal conscience and reason as a guide to human conduct, and hence a denial of ethics in our sense of the word.

With us, there is the idea that sin may be forgiven, wiped out. This

idea is reached only in the latest books of the Old Testament. Punishment is only withheld temporarily or passed on to others, but it is never cancelled.

There is evidence in the Old Testament of the presence of social conventions, the breach of which we would consider a sin. In the story of Abimelech and Abraham as told in Gen. 20, Abimelech told Abraham that he had done to him things not customarily done. Yet the breach of the social convention is not considered a sin on the part of Abraham. Deut. 12:8, indicates that certain conventions were in vogue before entering Canaan, but that now these must give place to divine ordinances. It may be claimed that since several of the laws of the code of the covenant have their parallels in the code of Hammurabi this code represents what were originally social conventions. That these laws or at least some of them were in vogue at a very early date, there is no doubt; on the other hand, there is no doubt but that the editor has raised them to the status of divine ordinances, and as such they must be considered in their context in the Old Testament.

It has become apparent, therefore, that the Hebrew concept of sin and ours does not coincide. This should be a sufficient reason for our study.

In certain of the late writings such as Job, Proverbs and exilic Judges the word for sin has some resemblance to the Greek ἀμαρτάνω, ^{amartano} "to miss the mark". However, in these passages the context would suggest "to lose" rather than "to miss", in such combinations as "he who finds me ----- he who loses me", (Prov. 8:35 f.), or in conjunction with nepshesh, "to lose one's life", (Prov. 20:2), or used with "hastey of feet", "to lose a race"; (Prov. 19:2), or used in contrast with shālôm, a state in which everything is complete and present, "to lose something or to miss something in a home from which one has been absent for a time". In Jd. 20:16, it is used of causing a stone "to miss a hair". This idea of sin as used by the Hebrews was attained only after a development of centuries. The phases through which the word passed before it attained that force are interesting. It seldom had a moral force in our sense of the word, throughout that history.

The simplest concept of the word is found in 1 Kgs. 1:22. Bathsheba tells David that should Adonijah become king after David's death, she and her son Solomon would become sinners. This can only mean that they would occupy inferior positions.

When Shimei cursed David fleeing from Jerusalem, the king told Abishai that Yahweh had said to Shimei: Curse David! This is an acknowledgement that Shimei was in the right. But when David was returning to Jerusalem, Shimei greeted him: "Let not my lord impute to me iniquity, let him not remember how your servant acted perversely when the king left Jerusalem that the king should take it to heart. Your servant knows he has sinned" (2 Sa. 19:20). The position of the two men has been reversed. Shimei is in an inferior position, and in danger of the king's anger. There may be here also an example of man's uncertainty as to whether he has sinned or not until he has noted the final outcome of his act.

In the story of Moses and Pharaoh - (Ex. 9:27 etc.), as a result of suffering from the plagues sent by Yahweh, Pharaoh said to Moses and Aaron: "I have sinned this time; Yahweh is righteous, while I and my people are the wicked ones." Pharaoh felt that he and his people had proved unequal to the

contest with Yahweh. He felt his inferiority in relation to Yahweh, not any consciousness of having done wrong. The editor recognizes that any other action on the part of the pharaoh had been impossible, for Yahweh made Pharaoh obstinate in order further to show his miraculous powers. The sin of Pharaoh then may be the expression of Pharaoh's feeling of inferiority; the stubbornness incited by the deity was to further his divine purpose.

In the story of the butler and the baker (Gen. 40:1), who had been incarcerated in Joseph's prison because they had sinned against Pharaoh, we are not told of what the sin consisted. The ultimate awards, however, show all the whimsical characteristics of the eastern potentate: One was restored to his position, and the other hanged. Verses 9f. seem to substantiate this idea: The butler says, "My sins, I remember today, Pharaoh was angry with his servants." The sin and Pharaoh's anger are connected. Pharaoh was angry, my position was inferior to his; he sent me to prison; later he restored me and hanged the baker.

The same inferiority was implied in Ex. 5:16 which relates the story of the Hebrews making bricks without straw. Pharaoh was annoyed because Moses had suggested a religious holiday for his people, and so forced them to work harder to produce the same number of bricks each day, at the same time gathering their own straw. Straw is not given to thy servants, yet they say unto us, Make bricks! and lo, thy servants are smitten, so thy people have sinned. The position of the Hebrews was so inferior to that of the Pharaoh that he could do as he would with them.

This idea of inferiority persisted in Israel. Owing to the siege of Jerusalem, Hezekiah sent a message to the king of Assyria at Lachish. "I have sinned; leave me alone; what you place upon me I will bear." Hezekiah recognized that he was not strong enough to compete with the Assyrian king, and confessed that feeling when he said, "I have sinned". He felt his inferiority in military strength; certainly not in moral right.

It was only when the Philistines were afflicted with a plague of tumours that they became conscious of any guilt (I Sa.6). They had no assurance whence the plague came, and sought to discover this by experiment. They felt themselves incapable of overcoming the affliction, hence that the source of affliction was more powerful than they. They felt their inferiority.

In Nu. 22, Balaam insisted that for no cause would he transgress the command of Yahweh. When Balak sent messengers to Balaam, God told Balaam to go with the men, and to say what He told him to say. While enroute the anger of Yahweh burned because he went, and the angel of Yahweh stood in his way. When Balaam realized the situation he said, "I have sinned, and now if it be evil in your eyes, let me turn back." But the angel told Balaam to continue on his way. In this passage the sin of Balaam is morally inexplicable. It is closely allied to the anger of Yahweh, just as the sin of the butler was closely allied with the anger of Pharaoh. Balaam could only have meant to infer his inferiority in regard to the deity and reiterate his willingness to do his will.

Closely connected with this idea of a feeling of inferiority is that of debt. The Hebrews expressed the ideal state, the state in which there is

no debt on either side as being shalem the state of perfection. This was the state that existed between David and Yahweh in the eyes of his later admirers. (Cf. 1 Kgs. 11:4, 15:3). The idea of a state of perfection in which debts are paid is reinforced by the use of the pi'el of the word shalam to mean "to pay back". It is used of paying vows, (Prov. 7:17); of recompensing, (Jer. 16: 18); of making restitution, (Ex. 22:2 etc.). Based on this fundamental idea of repayment is the whole spirit of the Hebrew law: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life for a life etc. Only when debts are fully paid can there be peace. The debtor is in an inferior position. To restore himself to that of an equal the debt must be paid.

When Laban pursued and overtook Jacob (Gen. 31:36 ff.) Jacob denied any sin or transgression in regard to Laban, and contended that he had served Laban's interests faithfully for twenty years. He continued, "That which was torn of beasts I brought not to you. I used to repay its equivalent to you (pi'el of ḥāṭā), of my hand you were wont to require it." The pi'el of ḥāṭā, "to sin", is used in parallel construction with "you were wont to require it at my hand". Usually it is translated, "stood the loss", but more specifically it is to pay back an equivalent to a loss. The animals were in his charge; even if through no fault of his own, a beast was torn, he had to return its equivalent to Laban, and Laban expected it. In the code of Hammurabi, law 263, we find the case of a herdsman who lets an ass or an ox confided to his care escape. The herdsman must make restitution, (i-ri-ab), an ox for an ox an ass for an ass. The holiness code uses the word yeshallem to express this idea of restitution. One must restore the state of perfection.

In Gen. 43:9, Judah pleads with his father to place Benjamin under his protection. It is I who will go surety for him. From my hand shall you seek him. If I do not bring him to you, and place him before you, I shall be sinning (qal of ḥāṭā) against you always. Jacob is to place Benjamin in Judah's hands, just as Laban placed his sheep in the hands of Jacob. If he does not restore him, (he cannot restore an equivalent), he will be indebted to Jacob forever. To sin against one is therefore to become his debtor.

Closely connected with this idea of debt which demands a repayment is the idea that repayment may take the form of a substitute. Jacob had given Laban a substitute for an animal that had been torn; Judah could not give a substitute for Benjamin, hence his perpetual debt. Just as a tooth must be given in payment for a tooth, so a sin must be given in payment for a sin, and an iniquity in payment for an iniquity. The payment given for a sin is usually translated as sin-offering and that of iniquity as punishment; but the Hebrew word did not distinguish between the sin and the payment for it, nor between the iniquity and the payment for it. They were looked upon as equivalents; the payment of an equivalent was essential to bring about the perfect state again. It was probably because of this basic characteristic of Hebrew thought that equivalent payments must be made, that they identified the payment with the debt, and so were forced to conclude that where there was payment, there must have been a corresponding debt.

To be morally responsible for a debt, the debtor must have accepted responsibility for that debt before it was incurred. It may be assumed that Jacob accepted that responsibility to make good any losses to Laban's flock,

when he accepted his contract; and that Judah accepted the responsibility for Benjamin's safe return before Jacob entrusted him to him. It must be added, however, that while these two men accepted responsibility for the loss of animal or boy under their protection, the actual loss was quite beyond the power of either of them. While the loss of one or the other would constitute a debt in our sense of the word, it would not constitute a sin. Neither Jacob or Judah had any intention of losing their charges.

A sin must be paid for by a sin, that is to say, by a payment in keeping with the debt. 1 Sa. 4:11, "If a slayer must pay for his deed by his blood, how much more a wicked man who slays a righteous man in his house in his bed." In this passage David is comparing the guilt and punishment due to the slayer of Saul and that of Ishbosheth. The slayers of both these men were perfectly aware that they had killed a man, but they believed that they were doing deeds which David would commend. Condemnation of the act of a subject by Chieftain or Deity makes him a sinner. It is this sense of the necessity of an equable payment for debts in order to preserve an even justice that impels the one making an oath to pray Yahweh to increase the injury to him if he does not carry out his vow.

Jonathan contended with Saul on behalf of David. He insisted that if Saul killed David who was innocent of any hostile move toward Saul, that Saul would have sinned. That is, Saul would have become indebted to David. He moreover claimed that Saul was already indebted to David because David had done good to him, (1 Sa. 19:4 f., cf. 1 Sa. 20:1, 7). When Saul realized that David could have slain him and did not, he recognized that he owed his life to David. He added: "I will not harm you more because my life was precious in your eyes today" (1 Sa. 26:21). When Hezekiah was hard pressed by Sennacherib he said: "I have sinned, what you place on me I will bear" (2 Kgs 18:14). The phrase "I have sinned" may be used to acknowledge a debt. In Nu. 12:11 ff. Miriam was stricken with leprosy because she and Aaron were envious of Moses' preferred position in regard to the deity. Aaron said to Moses: "O my lord, do not impose upon us a sin in which we have done foolishly and in which we have sinned. In this both Miriam and Aaron were equally guilty, but only Miriam suffered. It was not the sin that Moses imposed, but the payment of sin, which was an equivalent to the Hebrew. The payment exacted was that awarded a daughter who had offended her father, a seven day ostracism. The extent to which the persons noted in these passages are morally culpable depends upon how far they were conscious of doing wrong at the time of the offence. Saul, doubtless, looked upon David as a traitor to his dynasty; Hezekiah dreamed of independence from Assyria; Miriam and Aaron must have considered their complaint justified at the time.

Obadiah feared to announce to Ahab the arrival of Elijah, lest Elijah should not keep the rendezvous. He said: "How have I sinned?" i.e. what is my debt to you that you should bring about my death? Obadiah would infer that had he wronged Elijah in any way, then Elijah had been justified in bringing about his death. It was natural that debts should be paid.

The story of Abimelech and Abraham as narrated in Gen. 20, (and its parallels in Gen 12 and 26), gives some insight into the conception of sin as a debt imposed upon a morally innocent individual. In this case the "debt" is more nearly related to our word "fine", where ignorance of the law is not

considered an excuse. Abimelech has taken Sarah whom he believes to be Abraham's sister into his harem. He is prevented from consummating his marriage, and breaking a sex taboo, by a divine revelation. In the morning he called Abraham and said to him: "what have you done to us? how have I sinned against you, that you have brought upon me and my kingdom a great sin?" Ordinarily a sin must be paid for by a sin. In this case Abimelech has incurred no debt to Abraham, yet Abraham has imposed upon him a payment of a debt, or a fine, which is only wiped out by the payment of considerable wealth. Thus one may impose a sin which must be repaid, (i.e. a fine) upon a supposedly innocent person. The person has done no culpable act, yet he must pay the debt or fine imposed by the other. This idea is further reinforced by the passage in Ex. 32:20 ff. in which Moses, having destroyed the golden calf, said to Aaron: what has this people done to you that you have brought upon them this great sin. The people were innocent of any sin against Aaron, but Aaron has imposed it upon them, and they must pay it. Some three thousand were slain.

There is a subtle difference between doing evil to another and sinning against him. In many passages the words are used practically synonymously. Jephthah said to the king of Ammon: "I have not sinned against you, but you have done evil to me to fight against me" (Jd. 11:27). The men of Sodom were evil, great sinners against Yahweh. A man may sin against another or he may do evil to another. A man can sin against God but he can only do evil in his eyes. God may do evil to man, or he may do evil in the eyes of man, but He never sins against man. God is so far above man that man cannot harm Him, and God can never be indebted to man.

This difference between the relationship of man to man, and man to God is brought out in 1 Sa. 2: 24f. in which Eli remonstrates with his sons: "If a man sin against man, God will act as arbiter, but if a man sin against God who will act as arbiter?" It is interesting in this respect that Jephthah (Jd. 11:27) asks Yahweh to act as arbiter between Israel and Ammon; that David asked Yahweh to decide between him and Saul. In his prayer at the dedication of the temple Solomon asked Yahweh to decide on the innocence or guilt of any man accused of a sin, when he makes oath before the altar that he is innocent (1 Kgs. 8:21). Yahweh may decide an issue between men, but in the case of an issue between man and God, man is always guilty and must pay. There are a few passages, however, that suggest that man could at least mediate, if not arbitrate between God and man. In 1 Sa. 7:3, when the people have acknowledged their sin against Yahweh, Samuel acted as arbiter (shaphat), and a victory over the Philistines resulted. Moses frequently acted as a mediator in causes that arose between deity and people; but not always successfully. Amos and succeeding prophets followed suit.

In the Old Testament, most of the sins noted were acts which were not recognized as sins until after the event. Usually they were recognized as sins because of an unfortunate result. However, it seems possible that a sin could actually be a great advantage to not only the doer of the act, but to an entire people. Such an act is still considered as a debt to the deity which demands repayment by a life or by a ransom for that life. This is shown in the story of Saul's curse which he laid upon any who should eat during the day. Jonathan actually benefitted by eating of the honey, and a military victory resulted. However, when the guilt of Jonathan was

discovered by lot, he admitted his sin and his readiness to pay for it. The people however insisted on ransoming his life.

Sin was acting contrary to the divine will. However, the Israelites were never quite sure of what was the divine will. As a result they sometimes had recourse to trial and error. Sin was always a croucher at the door; one never knew when the beast would overtake him. This is clearly illustrated in the stories of the ark. Evidently the Philistines could handle it without great danger to themselves. According to 2 Sa. 6:7, Uzzah was slain by divine wrath because he tried to steady it. 50,070 men of Bethshemesh died because they looked into it. After the death of Uzzah, David decided to leave it at the home of Obed Edom, the Gittite, because he feared contact with it. When Obed Edom prospered, David took a chance and brought it to Jerusalem.

In the war with Ammon, when Joab was surrounded by the enemy, he encouraged the troops to do their best, to fight for themselves and for God---- and Yahweh will do what is good in his eyes (2 Sa. 10:12). When the son of Bathsheba was ill, David fasted and wept because he thought there was a chance Yahweh might be gracious to him (2 Sa. 12:22). When David fled from Jerusalem he said: If I find favor in the eyes of Yahweh, he will restore me----- if he say, I find no delight in you, -----he will do with me as is good in his eyes (2 Sa. 15:25).

We find numerous passages which seem to indicate that the Hebrews believed their deity instigated a sin on the part of persons in order to carry out his purpose logically. It may be noted that God told Abraham to go down to Egypt, and later to Gerar, and he told Isaac to go down to Gerar. These three passages are probably versions of the same incident. As a natural result of the presence of Sarah and Rebecca who were beautiful women, the king took them into his harem, discovered the truth of their relationship to their husbands, and paid the patriarchs considerable wealth. The sole purpose of these journeys seems to have been to enrich the friends of God.

The Joseph story is another case in point. In Gen. 50:20, we have the incident in which the brothers feared Joseph would requite them, on the death of their father, for what they had done to him. Joseph replied; "you thought evil against me, but God meant it for good, to bring to pass as it is today to save much people alive." Thus we must conclude that each incident in the story of Joseph was divinely inspired to bring about the final consummation. The envy of the brothers sent Joseph to Egypt; the temptation of Joseph by Potiphar's wife and his refusal to accede, brought him to prison; the butler and the baker's sin against the pharaoh brought them in touch with Joseph. The restoration of the butler to his former post brought Joseph and Pharaoh together.

It was Yahweh who hardened Pharaoh's heart so that he would not send the Israelites away, to the end that Yahweh might manifest his great powers in Egypt. This idea was entertained by E in 10:20, and by the redactor in other passages. This would indicate that this idea was prevalent for sometime.

One is tempted to see in the various murmurings and rebellions of the Israelites in the desert the same idea----that Yahweh might show his great powers. Ezekiel's idea of the Exodus was in keeping with this idea; "I

wrought for my name's sake, that it should not be polluted before the nations in whose sight I brought them out."

Yahweh has promised the descendants of Abraham the land of Canaan which was peopled with Amorites. Since it would take four hundred years for the iniquity of the Amorites to be fulfilled (Gen. 15:16), the settlement of the Israelites must be delayed until the four hundred years are up. Whether the deity has initiated this iniquity or not, he made full use of it for his own ends.

Yahweh sent an evil spirit between Abimelech and the Shechemites in order to get rid of Abimelech (Jd. 9:23). Yahweh may create a situation which would cause a king to oppress his people in order to incite them to leave Egypt.

Transgression is allied to sin. When Yahweh decided to divide the kingdom, he incited Jeroboam to revolt and transgress against Rehoboam, his anointed.

Another case in which the deity seems to have instigated a sin in order to get men to carry out his will may be noted in the story of David's census (2 Sa. 24). Yahweh became angry against Israel, and incited David to take the census. When David repented and confessed that he had sinned greatly, he asked the deity to cause the required payment for the sin to pass. Of three penalties suggested, David preferred a three day plague in which seventy thousand people died. David then reiterated that he had sinned, and insisted upon the innocence of his people; "Let thine hand be against me and my father's house." The prophet Gad, suggested the purchase of a site for a sanctuary, the erection of an altar, and animals for sacrifice. When David insisted on purchasing these things himself, he recognized that he, himself, must pay the debt or the fine imposed. Thereupon Yahweh permitted himself to be entreated and the plague was stopped. Yahweh, evidently, had two aims in exciting David to take the census: punishment of the people with whom he was angry, but whom David insisted to be innocent, and the possession of a sacred shrine on mount Zion.

The sons of Eli hearkened not to the voice of their father, for God wished to slay them, probably to make way for Samuel.

Allied to the idea of sin as a debt that demands a suitable payment is the idea of forgiveness. Nu. 14:18 ff., in describing the attributes of Yahweh, says that he pardons iniquity and transgression, without holding innocent, (or without leaving it completely unpunished), visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children. ---"Pardon, I pray thee, the iniquity of this people according to the greatness of thy kindness as thou hast pardoned this people from the time they left Egypt unto now." And Yahweh said, "I have pardoned them as you have asked, but as I live, they (the people) shall not see the land I promised their fathers." The words used for pardon are nāsā and ṣālah. They are used in such a way that ṣālah must be considered as practically synonymous with nāsā. Yahweh pardons their iniquities and transgressions, but lays them (visits them) upon their descendants. Or again Yahweh pardons but sentences the people to spend the remainder of their lives in the desert. The debt must be paid, if not by the sinner, by a descendant

or someone else. There is no pardon in our sense of the word, which would mean to blot out. This idea of blotting out of sin is only reached in Isaiah 43: 23, 25 and Psalm 51:3. *Nāsā* means literally "to lift up", "to bear". Someone must bear the sin or its payment; it cannot be wiped out. When Cain is sentenced, he says; "my iniquity, (i.e. the punishment or payment for my iniquity) is greater than I can bear." Aaron made the golden calf, but three thousand Israelites paid the penalty of the sin he placed upon them. When Hezekiah admitted his sin to Sennacherib, he promised to bear (*nāsā*) whatever payment for that sin Sennacherib should place upon him. In this case the sinner bears the penalty for sin. The forgiver is asked to bear (*nāsā*) the iniquity or sin, not to place it upon the sinner. The sin is therefore not wiped out in any way: it is carried either by the sinner or the one sinned against. If by the latter, it can be imposed at any time upon the sinner or upon another.

When David's treatment of Uriah was brought home to him by Nathan, David replied; "I have sinned against Yahweh." Then Nathan said; "Yahweh has caused thy sin to pass on, thou shalt not die, the son born to thee shall surely die. It is significant that David, the king, did not sin against Uriah, but against God; it was a debt that must be paid by a life. But Yahweh causes the debt to pass over to the son whose life pays for the debt of his father. That the debt was now considered fully paid by the death of the son is shown by the fact that Yahweh loved the next son born to Bathsheba (2 Sa. 12).

The deity may send a famine from which the entire nation suffers in order to impress upon them that a sin has been committed. The cause of the famine in the reign of David was the unrecorded slaughter of the Gibeonites by Saul. This is obviously an interpretation by a supporter of David. In order to stop the famine Saul's descendants had to die (2 Sa. 21).

What has been devoted to Yahweh is his. If a man take of it for his own use, he has sinned; he has become a debtor to Yahweh, and must pay the price. Contact with *herem* makes him *herem*. Not only the individual involved, but also his family must die. Even though there is a confession, there is no forgiveness (Jos. 7:11 ff). With this compare the sin of Hophni and Phineas who took the fat of the offerings devoted to Yahweh (1 Sa. 2:17).

We have now dealt with the elements connected with the idea of sin in the J, E and Historical works. The ideas portrayed in these sections must reflect the ideas of the thinkers of the period of the eighth century prophets, although each prophet may have contributed something to the problem individually. If we examine the problem as envisaged by the members of the Deuteronomic school we should obtain some idea of the basic ideas of sin as held by the religious leaders at the period of the exile and later.

The basic concept of these writers is that the worship of Yahweh can be carried out only in Jerusalem, and only in accordance with the ritual sanctified there. The worship of any other deity is the great sin, and the worship of Yahweh in any other shrine is equally a sign of rank apostasy. The author of Deuteronomy begins his discourse by explaining why Israel should worship Yahweh. "Since I, Yahweh your God, am the one who brought you out from the land of Egypt, from bondage, you shall have no other gods before me." The only way a slave could be removed from the possession of an owner was by purchase, or as a piece of loot from a military campaign. Since Yahweh brought Israel

from bondage, he has become its new owner. In 6:4, the author continues to impress upon his readers the idea of this new ownership. "Hear, O Israel, since Yahweh your God is Yahweh alone, you must love Yahweh your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength." Therefore, Israel as a nation owed allegiance to only one God, the God who had come to her aid in Egypt, in the wilderness, and in the period of settlement in Canaan. It was a debt, which Israel should accept according to this author. Worship of any other God was withholding Yahweh's property, and as such a sin which must be repaid. According to Dt. 7:8, Yahweh redeemed Israel from bondage in Egypt. The idea of redemption is the paying of a ransom to the holder, and thereby becoming the new owner of the person, persons or thing. This gave Yahweh a legal claim to Israel. This concept would infer that the redeemed had no say in the matter. The worship of Yahweh in a shrine outside Jerusalem by rites other than those practiced in Jerusalem, or the worship of another God would be the equivalent of theft from Yahweh, and the supreme penalty of death is the only fitting payment that can be made. The relationship between ~~דָּבָר~~, "a slave, or devotee," and ~~עָבָד~~, "to worship" is revealing. Both forms denote an ownership of real property. *abad* *bed*

Since apostasy is the supreme sin of the Deuteronomic school, it was considered a sign of apostasy for the people to demand a king (1 Sa. 8:6, 18). The king, himself, however would exact payment for this sin because Yahweh would refuse to hear them when they find themselves oppressed by the king they have chosen.

The perfect state, that in which all debts are paid, can be attained only by those who worship Yahweh in Jerusalem. Only they can attain a happy and prosperous existence. All others must be destroyed.

When our authors are giving an interpretation of history they are forced to conclude that Yahweh did not forgive sins such as disobedience or rebellion, even when a righteous mediator prays for it. In chap. 1, even though the Israelites confessed their sins and repented, they had to die in the wilderness. In chap. 3, Yahweh refused to listen to Moses. In chap. 4, Moses was prevented from entering the promised land because of the words of the Israelites. In this section the sinners presumably enter the promised land, while their righteous mediator is refused permission.

As the Deuteronomist looks into past history, he finds repeatedly that Yahweh does not forgive without exacting a payment. There is always the hope, however, that he may. The author would suggest that even an apostate, by turning to Yahweh in his trouble, may find Yahweh merciful (4:8). In the prayer of Solomon at the dedication of the temple in 1 Kgs. 8, he asks that Yahweh pardon Israel as a nation or as individuals when they have confessed their sins, recognized as such only after some misfortune has befallen them, such as defeat, drought, famine, plague, when they have made their prayers in the temple or in a foreign land, but according to the custom sanctified by its use in the temple. It is interesting that their interpretation of the past does not preclude them from hoping for something better in the future.

The Deuteronomist still retains some of the ideas of the older writers in regard to the divine character. Just as Yahweh made Pharaoh refuse to

let Israel go that he might continue to manifest his powers, so he made Sihon refuse to let Israel pass through his land, that Israel might be able to defeat Sihon's forces and so attain glory. Yahweh still visits the iniquities of the fathers upon the children, but evidently only upon the children of apostates (5:9).

Moral conduct is not yet a matter of conscience. If a problem is too difficult for local authorities to decide, the people involved must take the matter to the priest at the central shrine in Jerusalem, and his decision must be carried out carefully. The man who behaves presumptuously, not hearkening to the priest, who continuously serves Yahweh thy God, or to the judge, that man shall die, so shalt thou destroy evil from Israel. And when all the people hear it, they shall fear, and never act presumptuously again. To act presumptuously, therefore, is to decide a question contrary to the dictum of the priestly authority, to decide a matter according to one's own conscience or reason.

To act presumptuously is therefore to sin. Death is the penalty. The death of such a man became an example to the rest of the people. The death of such a sinner, therefore, has a divine purpose over and above that of punishment of an individual. In a society in which the nation is a unit, the life of an individual cannot be highly considered over against the benefit his death might bring to the community as an example. His death has become a warning to the rest of the people, and therefore a means by which they gain knowledge of the right way.

We have noted the priests as the conscience of the people. According to chap. 8, the conscience of the people had been magicians, soothesayers, necromancers; Yahweh, however, insisted that he himself should be their conscience. In the wilderness Moses had acted as such, but according to Deut. 34, there will be no more prophet in Israel like Moses. Other means were required. Although Deuteronomy is usually considered as the work of a prophetic school, possibly descendants of the disciples of Isaiah, because of his fondness for the temple ritual exemplified in Jerusalem, other prophets than Moses are only mentioned twice, each time as divinely appointed consciences of the people. This was a device decided by the deity in Horeb when the people insisted that Moses be their mediator with the deity (Dt. 18: 16). People were required to obey this prophet for his word came directly from Yahweh. Samuel showed himself a true descendant of Moses. He became the mediator between God and people, and the conscience of Israel, in that he taught them the upright way (I Sa. 14). It was a way not delimited by human reason.

The prophet who presumptuously speaks a word in my name that which I did not command him to speak, or who speaks in the name of other Gods, shall die. A prophet who speaks according to the reason of his own heart is a sinner worthy of death. The true prophet, therefore, is divinely appointed to become the conscience of the people. Since there may be true prophets as well as prophets who follow their own consciences or reason, there must be some form by which the people may know the true prophet of Yahweh. The test is given in 18:22. "When a prophet speaks in the name of Yahweh and the thing does not come to pass and does not happen, that is an oracle which Yahweh has not spoken. That prophet has spoken presumptuously, you need not

fear him." This would infer that historical events follow the oracle of Yahweh. They cannot be inferred before hand through rational processes. History, is, therefore, the proof of a divine oracle. The prophet, therefore, like the priest is a divinely appointed conscience of the people. "When a prophet or a dreamer of dreams shall arise in your midst, and give you a sign or a wonder, and that sign or wonder which he gives you comes to pass ---- (This is proof that he is a true prophet, cf 18:22). "If, however, that prophet encourage the people to worship other gods, you must not obey him. That prophet must be put to death for he has spoken rebellion against Yahweh." It is rather startling to find a proved prophet speaking rebellion, but verse 4 explains it. Yahweh, your God, is using this prophet to test you, that you may know that you are properly worshipping Yahweh.

The idea of testing in order to teach the people is found also in the earlier work. At the giving of the decalogue in Ex. 20:20, the people feared the manifestations of Yahweh and asked Moses to be their mediator---- And Moses said unto the people; "Fear not, for in order to test you (naṣṣôth) God has come, and that his fear may be before you that you sin not." Here, obviously, the testing was for the benefit of the people and not of the deity. So in Deuteronomy, the proved prophet was raised up to entice the people from Yahweh, that they might know the better, that they worship Yahweh truly. The death of the prophet is the natural result of his act, but Yahweh has taught his people a lesson; he has raised up another indicator for their guidance. It cannot be mere coincidence that the following verses deal with the enticement to apostasy by a friend or kinsman, and with the base fellows who would entice a city to apostasy. These, like the prophet, were to be divine instruments to act as guides to the Israelite conscience. Their deaths will serve as a lesson to Israel. The affliction and testing in the wilderness mentioned in Dt. 8, must have been for a similar purpose, that the people might have another guidepost, a conscience to direct their course aright. It is of interest that in the following verse the afflicting is continued to cause you to know etc. (cf. this prophet with the Kings of Israel who made Israel to sin.)

Yahweh was always testing his people, not for his benefit but for theirs. Whenever they were oppressed by their enemies they must have sinned. Whenever they were victorious, Yahweh was pleased with them. By noting in retrospect their activities which resulted in failure or success, they had a guide to their future conduct. It should be pointed out that this method of instruction leads rather to a conduct of expediency rather than morality. Israel would learn to do what would not bring disaster in its train.

Samuel proved his divine mission, and hence the truth of his words that Israel had sinned in asking a king, by foretelling the coming of a thunderstorm at a season when such was not usual. In Sa. 15, we note that Samuel persists in being the conscience of Saul, while Saul is inclined to behave rationally. He saved Agag, king of Amalek, and some of his choice possessions as loot. Samuel, thereupon, announced that Yahweh had rejected Saul as King, and Saul admits his sin and transgression against the word of God as spoken by Samuel. In one line Samuel announces that Yahweh had repented making Saul king, and soon after that He will not repent for he is not a man that he should repent. Evidently Yahweh's refusal to forgive Saul was that events must make way for David. It was probably the same author who conceived the idea that Yahweh instigated the sin of Hophni and Phineas because he wished to slay them.

The prophet, having completed the task assigned may suffer death through divine decree. This was true in Dt. 13. The Judaeen prophet proved the authenticity of his mission to condemn the altar of Bethel, the existence of which was contrary to the Deuteronomic ideal of centralized worship, by paralyzing Jeroboam's hand. The Bethel prophet proved his authentic mission by foretelling the death of the Judaeen prophet. Thus both prophets were of Yahweh. The Judaeen prophet had been ordered home without stopping to eat in Bethel. The Bethel prophet induced him to return and eat with him by revealing to the Judaeen prophet orders to return to Bethel. While eating in Bethel the local prophet revealed a new decree foretelling the death of the Judaeen. The Judaeen prophet was in a quandary. Had he refused to return he would have disobeyed the orders sent to the Bethel prophet. By returning he disobeyed the orders sent to himself. It seems that the Judaeen prophet was doomed (I Kgs. 13).

Like the earlier authors, the Deuteronomist conceived that it was not always the sinner who suffered for a sin. In I Kgs., the deity replies to Solomon's prayer, and promises him an everlasting kingdom should he remain true to the law of Yahweh. However, if Solomon should not remain true, Israel will be cut off from its heritage. Even in the promise, Israel is the one who pays for Solomon's apostasy. In chap. 11, when Solomon has become apostate through the influence of foreign wives, the intermarriage with whom was contrary to Deuteronomic teaching, Yahweh promises to take the kingdom from Solomon and give it to Jeroboam. The sufferer is the son of the sinner. This was true also in the case of Jeroboam whose son Nadab suffered and of Baasha for whom Elah suffered.

Finally there is the sin insinuated solely by the editor who insisted that history support his ideas on people in question. In I Sa. 14:47, we learn that Saul fought all the enemies of Israel, and wherever he turned he was wont to do wickedness (וַיִּשְׁפָּט וַיִּשְׁפָּט "was defeated"). To the editor it was quite distasteful to admit any good of Saul. (He simply changed a waw to a resh. The original must have read וַיִּשְׁפָּט, "he was victorious.")

The Deuteronomist insisted on centralized worship in Jerusalem, carried out by duly appointed priests or levites. Jeroboam's sin was in erecting altars outside Jerusalem and appointing priests from his own borders. Such actions constituted a sin which would bring destruction to his house (I Kgs. 13). Jeroboam died peacefully, it was his descendant that paid. Baasha was raised up to destroy the house of Jeroboam; Baasha's sin was the same as that of Jeroboam. That these statements pertaining to the sin of Jeroboam and his successors were purely a literary device is shown by the fact that although Zimri reigned only seven days, and that only over a very limited area his fate was sealed for causing Israel to sin in the manner of Jeroboam the son of Nebat.

It was natural, therefore, for the Deuteronomist to interpret the destruction of Northern Israel as divine retribution for apostasy (2 Kgs. 17:7) while Judah remained secure with its central shrine. Although the Deuteronomic editor re-iterates the idea that Yahweh's prophets continually acted as the conscience of the kings of the North in this respect, it is significant that neither Elijah nor Elisha worshipped at Jerusalem, or even recognized it as the house of Yahweh.

In this study I have tried to assess and classify the various Hebrew concepts of sin which must have been current from the eighth to the sixth centuries. A comparison between the hypotheses which underlie our concepts of sin with those that seem to have formed a basis for the Hebrew concept shows very little in common. Superficially the debt principle as noted somewhat resembles our concept. However in most of the incidents noted the debt was only recognized as such after the deed had been accomplished, and its unpleasant effects noted. With us, it seems to me that a debt is only morally payable when the debtor is conscious of the debt at the time he accepts it. Of the incidents in the Old Testament the only cases in which this was true were those of Jacob and Laban, and Judah and Jacob. In both cases, when the contract was made, Jacob and Judah hoped that the debt would never materialize. They simply went surety for the animals and boy placed in their charge. It is significant, too, that these cases which most clearly represent our concept of a debt could never be described by a westerner as sin.

The Deuteronomic idea of punishment for sin as an example to others that they might steer clear of similar sins can only lead to a conduct of expediency. That it did so is shown by the author of Job when he said: "Does Job fear God for nought?"

It would appear, therefore, that we should either find another word for the Hebrew "sin", which would reflect the significance of the word as used by the Hebrews or we should carefully define it in such a way as to give the reader some grasp of its significance. As it is, it must cause a certain consternation to the casual reader to learn that the deity incites men to sin to carry out his divine purpose.

W. E. Staples

JEROME'S REVISIONS OF THE LATIN PSALTER

Dr. F.H. Cosgrave

The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to the discussions of D. Donatien De Bruyne on Jerome's Revisions of the Latin Psalter (Revue Benedictine 41 and 42, 1929---1930. See also his article in Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 28 Band 1929 on Jerome's letter to Sunnia and Fretela).

It has been generally assumed for the past two centuries that the Psalterium Romanum or Roman Psalter is the work of Jerome and represents his first effort at a revision of the Latin Psalter. De Bruyne argues that Jerome could not have had anything to do with it. It abounds in readings, interpolations and Harmonizations of which Jerome could not have approved even at the time at which it was supposed to have been made. The story that Jerome made the Psalterium Romanum for Pope Damasus about the year 382 is based on a correspondence between Pope Damasus and Jerome which is clearly apocryphal.

Jerome's first revision of the Latin Psalter was actually made for certain Roman ladies, Marcella and Paula, and no Manuscript of it has come down to us. It was probably suppressed by Jerome himself after his study of Origen's Hexapla in Palestine. It is not to be identified with the Psalterium Romanum used in many parts of Latin Christendom until it was limited to St. Peter's in Rome and one or two other places by Pope Pius V in the sixteenth century.

We can recover in a general way the character of Jerome's first revision of the Latin Psalter from his letters and commentaries written in the period 384-385. The text of the Psalter assumed in these is nearer to the so-called Gallican Psalter than it is to what we know as the Roman Psalter.

Jerome's second revision, the so-called Gallican Psalter, made in Palestine after his study of Origen's Hexapla, was not designed for liturgical use. An edition with obeli and asterisks is not a practical edition but a timid effort after a scientific edition. The preface is addressed not to any prominent ecclesiastic but to Paula and Eustochium, mother and daughter, who had settled with Jerome in Palestine. Its liturgical use was not common in the Western Church until the ninth century and not general until the time of Pope Pius V in the sixteenth century. The name "Gallican" Psalter cannot be traced earlier than the ninth century and is misleading. It would be better to refer to it as the Latin Hexaplaric Psalter (le psautier hexaplaire (latin)).

Finally the famous letter of Jerome to Sunnia and Fretela, two Gothic presbyters who are supposed to have written to him asking for an explanation of various readings in the so-called Gallican Psalter is a literary fiction. This letter was written not for Goths but for Latins and its purpose is to explain and defend these readings to persons accustomed to use other Latin Psalters.

Those who are convinced of the validity of De Bruyne's arguments will be able to make the necessary corrections in their textbooks on this subject. Readers of the second volume of Rahlfs's Septuaginta-Studien should note that in his critical edition of the Septuagint Psalms published much more recently he adopted De Bruyne's views on these matters.

F.H. Cosgrave.

THE ORDER OF THE FOUR JUDGMENTS IN REVELATION 6:8b

Dr. J.H. Michael

The four instruments of judgment enumerated in Rev. 6:8b --- sword, famine, pestilence, & wild beasts --- are employed, not by Death & Hades (who have just been mentioned in ver. 8a) but by the four Horsemen of vv. 1-8a. Sword, famine, & pestilence are clearly associated respectively with the second, the third, & the fourth of the Horsemen.

But what of the wild beasts? It can be shown that the four Riders correspond to four of the twelve Signs of the Zodiac. The first of the four answers to the Lion. Time was divided into cycles of 12 years, each year being ruled over by one of the Signs of the Zodiac. A feature of the year of the Lion was "an epiphany of wild beasts".

The wild beasts, then, pertain to the first seal. But why are they placed last in ver. 8b. The position does not seem to be accidental.

The various O.T. enumerations of the four devastations do not help us, for in each case the order is different from that of John.

The suggestion of this Note is that John's order is derived from Psalms of Solomon XLIII. 2, 3 where the four plagues occur in that very order.

The reference to the four plagues is particularly clear in what would seem to be the original Hebrew text of the Psalm.

John must have been acquainted with this little Psalm of comfort; and its list of the judgments from which the Lord had delivered His people may well have been fixed in his mind.

Not Pashhur but Terror: A Critical Analysis of Jer. 19:14-20:6.

Rev. F. North

An objective evaluation of the textual evidence supplied by Hebrew manuscripts and several of the ancient versions reveals that a concise basic narrative has been expanded considerably by the addition of later material. This is most noticeable at the end, where there are three verses of secondary matter.

The basic narrative is the following:

Jeremiah came and stood in the court of The House of the Lord and said to all the people,

"Thus saith The Lord, 'I am bringing a disaster upon this city.'"

Now Pashhur ben-Immer the priest heard Jeremiah delivering this message. So he gave him a beating and put him in the stocks.

Then Pashhur took Jeremiah out of the stocks and Jeremiah said.

"The Lord has called you not Pashhur but Terror."

Many textual and literary problems are solved most satisfactorily by a recognition of the process of growth by accretion, which finally produced our present text.